The biggest change is that the Contracting Governments to the 1974 SOLAS Convention will be able to formally exercise of control over ships in accordance with the provisions of chapter XI-2 and of the ISPS Code.

At the same time, the Contracting Governments will be obliged to address all the objectives and functional requirements of the ISPS Code and to ensure that appropriate security measures and procedures are in place in the port facilities and waterways located within their territory.

The new requirements form the international framework through which Governments, ships and port facilities can co-operate to detect and deter acts which threaten security in the maritime transport sector.

The new regulatory maritime security regime will have a huge impact for those port facilities and ship operators who had not already taken on board the increased threat to maritime security in the current climate. They will need to catch up, according to the rules and guidelines in the ISPS Code.

For those Governments and ship operators who have already implemented enhanced security regimes, the ISPS Code formalises and standardises globally the security measures.

The point is that there is a very real threat. We have already seen attacks on maritime infrastructures elsewhere (such as Yemen and Iraq).

The whole idea of the ISPS Code is to reduce the vulnerability of the industry to attack, thus countering the threat and reducing the risk.

There are potential commercial benefits to the maritime industry in implementing the Code. It seems clear that, in the long run, implementation of the Code should provide considerable cost-benefit for the port industry as a whole and for individual ports. By putting in place an effective and compliant security regime, ports will be able to continue to participate fully in global trade and, of course, the potential economic consequences of a major security breach, which might result in disruption or even port closure, are serious indeed.

Ship and port facility security is a risk management activity. As with all risk management efforts, the most effective course of action is to eliminate the source of the threat. Eliminating the source of the threat, which in this case is those that would commit acts of terrorism or otherwise threaten the security of ships or of the port facilities, is essentially a Government function. 100% security is an aim but cannot be guaranteed - hence the risk reduction approach to lessen possibilities to the lowest practicable.

 
In order to determine what security measures are appropriate, Governments must assess the threat and evaluate the risk of a potential unlawful act. The ISPS Code provides a standardized, consistent framework for managing risk and permitting the meaningful exchange and evaluation of information between Contracting Governments, companies, port facilities, and ships.

 
Because each ship and each port facility is subject to different threats, the method by which they will meet the specific requirements of this ISPS Code will be determined and eventually be approved by the Administration or Contracting Government, as the case may be.

 
In order to communicate the threat at a port facility or for a ship and to initiate the appropriate response actions the Contracting Government must set the appropriate security level. The security level creates a link between the ship and the port facility, since it triggers the implementation of appropriate security measures for the ship and for the port facility.

 
As threat increases, the only logical counteraction is to reduce vulnerability. This ISPS Code provides several ways to reduce vulnerabilities. Each ship and each port facility will have to determine the measures needed to intensify its security measures to appropriately offset the threat by reducing its vulnerability.

 
After 1 July 2004 ships and port facilities will be required to demonstrate that they are implementing proper and standardized risk management procedures.

It has to be remembered that the new security requirements are part of a wider United Nations strategy for combating terrorism and should not be seen in isolation.

 
As with all other aspects of shipping regulated through multilateral treaty instruments the effectiveness of the agreed requirements is dependant on how the relevant provisions are implemented and enforced. Thus, the matter is in the hands of Governments and the industry. If the special measures to enhance maritime security are implemented and enforced effectively we will be successful in protecting ships and ports facilities from unlawful acts.

 
It may take some time before someone may be able to argue and convince that a deep rooted comprehensive and effective security net is in place. Although a ship or a port facility may operate in accordance with an approved security plan, unless all Contracting Governments put in place and maintain the necessary arrangements to address all the objectives and the functional requirements of the ISPS Code, the actual level of security will not be enhanced.

 
The ISPS Code requires Governments to gather and assess information with respect to security threats and exchange such information with other Contracting Governments. Shipboard and port facility personnel need to be aware of security threats and needs to report security concerns to the appropriate authorities for their assessment. Governments need to communicate security related information to ships and port facilities. Therefore, in effect we are talking about establishing an entirely new culture amongst those involved in the day-to-day running of the shipping and port industry.

Those ships, which do not comply with the aforesaid requirements, should not be issued with International Ship Security Certificates (or after the 1 July 2004, if they qualify, with an Interim International Ship Security Certificate).

 
In the strict legal sense and bearing in mind that we are talking about security, all Contracting Governments should direct those ships flying their flag and which are required to comply with the requirements of chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code and which have not been issued with the required certificate by the 1 July 2004 to immediately discontinue operations until they have been issued with the required certificate.

 
A ship, which is required to comply with the requirements of chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code, is subject to control and compliance measures when in a port of another Contracting Government by officers duly authorised by that Government. IMO has issued MSC/Circ.1111 Guidance relating to the implementation of SOLAS chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code

 
This circular includes:

• ANNEX 1 GUIDANCE RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SOLAS CHAPTER XI-2 AND THE ISPS CODE

• ANNEX 2 RESOLUTION MSC.159(78) INTERIM GUIDANCE ON CONTROL AND COMPLIANCE MEASURES TO ENHANCE MARITIME SECURITY

In simple terms, if a ship does not have a valid certificate that ship may be detained in port until it gets a certificate. Of course, the port State has various other options available at its disposal if a ship does not have a certificate. It may expel the ship from port, it may refuse the entry of the ship into port, it may curtail the operations of the ship. In effect the measures which are in place have been designed in such a way to ensure that those ships which do not have certificates find themselves out of the market in the shortest possible time.

 
The consequences of either initially failing to comply or of failing to maintain continuous compliance with IMO's special measures to enhance maritime security will be serious and far reaching. It should come as no surprise if, after July 1st, we see Governments exercising, in the interest of their own national security and in order to protect the business operations of their ports and thus their trade, the rights laid down within the framework of the control and compliance measures established in chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code. Hence, Governments may refuse entry into their ports to those ships which have failed to comply with the ISPS Code. In addition and for the same reasons, ships which call at port facilities which have failed to comply with the ISPS Code, although they may hold a valid International Ship Security Certificate, may be faced with additional security requirements at subsequent ports of call, leading to delays and possibly denial of port entry.

 
With such possible scenarios looming on the horizon, owners and charterers may decide to instruct ships not to proceed to port facilities which have not complied with the requirements of the ISPS Code, primarily because of the problems such ships may encounter at subsequent ports of call. While failure to ensure compliance may have catastrophic consequences on human life and the environment, it will also damage the commercial interests of the countries concerned, will have harmful repercussions on international trade and will negatively impact the world economy.

 
Terrorism is not a matter of concern to one country or a group of countries - it is a global issue and we should address it as such. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. K. Annan, has put it in similar terms: "Terrorism is a global scourge with global effects." In this particular case, maybe more than in others, prevention is better, much better, than cure. The comforting yet complacent argument that some of us may hope never to become victims of a terrorist act is of no value here. With the interdependence of the world's economies today, the chain reaction that such an act may trigger will have a major negative impact on trade and the global economy - we will all be victims; as we would certainly have been if the attack on the Basra oil terminal had not been foiled and we would now suffer the repercussions of the major impact it would have on oil pricing- more than it has already had.

What would happen to ships, having visited ports where the ISPS Code is not implemented properly, when they intend to enter ports where the ISPS Code is implemented vigorously?

To address this question one has to examine two possible scenarios.

 
The first scenario presupposes that the Government at the next port of call has reliable information that the security measures at a particular port facility are inadequate. In such a case a responsible approach will be for the two Governments to communicate and to resolve the issues of concern.

 
The second scenario, assumes that, during the stay of a ship at a particular port facility, the ship and/or someone representing the port facility or the Government where the ship is to proceed next are able to assess the security measures which the particular port facility was implementing during the stay of the ship. In this respect, one has to bear in mind that in a lot of case the security measures in place may be of a covert nature and a third party may not be able to identify or to appreciate them.

 
MSC 78 has considered the issue of security concerns, where a ship has concerns about the security of a port facility, which is supposed to operate in accordance with an approved Port Facility Security Plan. In this respect the Committee decided to draw the attention to the fact that certain of the security measures may be of a covert nature and may not be easily identified. Thus, the Committee recommended that the ship, as a first step, should contact the port facility security officer (PFSO) and discuss the matter. If no remedial action is agreed then the ship should contact the authorities of its flag State and raise the matter with them for their consideration and action.

 
In any case, if a ship has concerns about the security measures in places at a particular port facility and the ship has not been able to resolve such concerns with the particular PFSO, the ship should establish appropriate security measures and procedures and should document them. When asked at any subsequent port of call, the master of the ship should presented the record it has kept on the matter for the consideration of the relevant authorities.

 
Of course in all cases the ship is subject to control and compliance measures at subsequent ports of call and what might happened to a ship is dependant on the attitude the particular Government might take on the matter depending on the merits of each case. This may range from a requirement for inspection prior to entry into port to an outright refusal of entry into port.

 
See also MSC/Circ.1111 Guidance relating to the implementation of SOLAS chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code
This circular includes:

• ANNEX 1 GUIDANCE RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SOLAS CHAPTER XI-2 AND THE ISPS CODE

• ANNEX 2 RESOLUTION MSC.159(78) INTERIM GUIDANCE ON CONTROL AND COMPLIANCE MEASURES TO ENHANCE MARITIME SECURITY

How can I find out if a ship or port is compliant?

A ship that is compliant should have an International Ship Security Certificate (ISSC).

  
The "ISPS Code Database", which forms an integral part of the Organization's Global Integrated Shipping Information System (GISIS), contains the information required by SOLAS regulation XI-2/13 as supplied by Contracting Governments, including national maritime security contact points. The ISPS Code database has a section listing ports including whether or not they have an approved port facility security plan (PFSP).

The threat of terrorist acts against the shipping and port industry are real and not imaginary. It is for these reasons the Assembly of IMO, in November 2001, decided that the Organization should review measures and procedures to prevent acts of terrorism which threaten the security of passengers and crew and the safety of ships. It is also obvious that the Contracting Governments to the 1974 SOLAS Convention, when they adopted the special measures to enhance maritime security in December 2002, were well aware of potential threats.

 
Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code provide a methodology of addressing security threats and managing potential risks which ships and ports involved in the international trade may face. IMO is of the view they are adequate to protect the shipping and the port industry if implemented and enforced wisely and effectively in conjunction with the wider United Nations counter terrorism strategy. Ships engaged on domestic voyages and ports which serve such ships need to be addressed by each Government individually and each Government needs to put in place appropriate security measures and procedures to this end based their assessment of the security threats.

 
Security threats change from day-to-day. Governments need to monitor changes and to offset them, as they occur, by communicating appropriate information and guidance to ships and port facilities. Security is not a static issue and requires continuous awareness, vigilance and prompt response.

 
The IMO has provided a methodology in addressing the matter by introducing a global minimum standard. Individual Governments can use these as a basis for expansion as appropriate.

All appropriate measures should be taken in accordance with the perceived local needs.

Some examples might include regular and intensive patrolling at the local level in identified vulnerable sea/port areas. In addition, joint patrolling and exchange of real time intelligence and threat perception among countries at a regional level would have a meaningful impact in preventing incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships.

For measures to be applied for container security, it is important to put in place the necessary measures for shippers and container packers to secure the "real content" of containers. This area is beyond the scope of IMO and necessary measures have been under consideration at the World Customs Organization (WCO).

Logically it should be so. In the months leading up to the 1 July 2004 deadline of the ISPS Code, there has been a reduction in the number of incidents reported to have occurred during the first quarter of 2004. There could be a possible correlation between the two but only a careful monitoring over a longer period would give a firm indication of the long-term trend in this respect.

 
Chapter XI-2 includes a regulation addressing threats to ships at sea. This regulation requires Governments to set security levels and ensure the provision of security level information to ships operating in their territorial sea or having communicated an intention to enter their territorial sea.

 
Where a risk of attack has been identified, the Government concerned shall advise the ships concerned and their flag State of the current security level; of any security measures that should be put in place by the ships concerned to protect themselves from attack; and of the security measures that the coastal State has decided to put in place.

Thus, at least the international framework has been put in place to address the matter. Now is up to Governments to implement it.

IMO Secretary-General Mr. Efthimios Mitropoulos has stressed the importance of ensuring that strategically important international shipping lanes are protected from the threat of terrorism and remain open for trade at all times and has emphasized the need to ensure that shipping lanes, particularly those of strategic significance and importance, are kept open under all circumstances.

 
Maritime security experts have identified a number of scenarios: loaded oil tankers could well be hijacked and grounded at environmentally sensitive sea areas to cause pollution or run aground intentionally in narrow channels to block navigation channels. In addition, loaded oil tankers could be used as potential incendiary devices by terrorists near ports and large anchorage areas.

 
SOLAS regulation XI-2/7 relating to threats to ships at sea requires littoral States to advise the ships concerned and their flag State of the current security level; of any security measures that should be put in place by the ships concerned to protect themselves from attack; and of the security measures that the coastal State has decided to put in place.

The maritime security provisions of SOLAS chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code are part of a wider initiative to counter terrorism, including action by the Counter Terrorist Committee of the UN Security Council through resolution 1373, co-operation with the WCO on container security, joint initiatives with the ILO on port security and identification documents etc.

 
It is better to have a tool that we can refine and improve over time, than nothing at all. After all, those who would wish to spread terror, should they choose to launch an attack against shipping, would surely look to strike where they detect the greatest weakness.

 
The Maritime Safety Committee and its subsidiary bodies are continuously working on additional elements of and guidance for the mandatory requirements, i.e. Ship Security Alert Systems (SSAs), long-range identification and tracking (LRIT) of ships, control and compliance measures, training and certification of security officers, etc.

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Source: International Maritime Organisation